Hong Kong PCPD: Cross-border transfers with China (PIPL)

“Cross-border Transfer of Data under the Personal Information Protection Law of the Mainland” — Privacy Commissioner’s article contribution at Hong Kong Lawyer (December 2021)

The Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) of the Mainland, which became effective on 1 November 2021, is the first piece of legislation dedicated to the protection of personal information in the Mainland. As the PIPL imposes requirements on the transfer of personal information from the Mainland to other jurisdictions, this article attempts to highlight the rules and the more salient requirements for businesses in Hong Kong.

https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/news_events/speech/speeches_202112.html

EDPB: Guidelines 01/2021 on Examples regarding Personal Data Breach Notification

https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/edpb_guidelines_012021_pdbnotification_adopted_en.pdf
Adopted on 14 December 2021
Version 2.0

  • mentions a controller internal “Handbook of Handling Personal Data Breah” (as good practice)
  • internal documentation required for each and every breach (regardless of risk)

includes:

2 RANSOMWARE

2.1 CASE No. 01: Ransomware with proper backup and without exfiltration

2.2 CASE No. 02: Ransomware without proper backup

  • Notification to SA

2.3 CASE No. 03: Ransomware with backup and without exfiltration in a hospital

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

2.4 CASE No. 04: Ransomware without backup and with exfiltration

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

2.5 Organizational and technical measures for preventing / mitigating the impacts of ransomware attacks

  • Patch management
  • Network/system segmentation
  • Backups
  • Malware controls
  • Network security (firewall, IDS)
  • Phishing training
  • Forensics (identify the type of malicious code, -> nomoreransom.org)
  • Central log server
  • Strong encryption and MFA (multifactor authnetication), esp. for admins, appropriate key and password management
  • Vulnerability/penetration testing
  • CSIRT/CERT team
  • Reviews/tests/updates of risk analysis

3 Data Exfiltration ATTACKS

3.1 CASE No. 05: Exfiltration of job application data from a website

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

3.2 CASE No. 06: Exfiltration of hashed password from a website

3.3 CASE No. 07: Credential stuffing attack on a banking website

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

3.4 Organizational and technical measures for preventing / mitigating the impacts of hacker attacks

  • Strong encryption, key managemenet. Hashed/salted passwords. Prefer authentication controls without need to process passwords on server
  • Patch management
  • Strong authentication methods (e.g. 2FA), up-to-date password policy
  • Secure Software Development standards (input validation, brute force controls). Web Application Firewalls (WAF) might help.
  • Strong user privileges and access control management policy
  • Network security (firewall, IDS)
  • Security audits and vulnerability assessmnents
  • Backup controls are reviewed and tested
  • No session ID in URL in plain text

4 INTERNAL HUMAN RISK SOURCE

4.1 CASE No. 08: Exfiltration of business data by an employee

  • Notification to SA

4.2 CASE No. 09: Accidental transmission of data to a trusted third party

4.3 Organizational and technical measures for preventing / mitigating the impacts of internal human risk sources

  • Privacy and security awareness training
  • Data protection practices, procedures and systems (robust, effective, evaluated and improved)
  • Access control policies
  • User authentication when accessing sensitive personal data
  • Revocation of user access as soon as user leaves company
  • Checks for unusual dataflow between servers and clients
  • Technical controls on use of portable media (USB, CD, DVD, ..)
  • Access policy reviews
  • Disabling open cloud services
  • Preventing access to known open mail services
  • Disable print screen function in OS
  • Enforce clean desk policy
  • Automatic locking of computers after defined time of user inactivity
  • Use mechanisms (e.g. hardware tokens) for fast user switches in shared environments
  • Dedicated systems for manageing personal data. – Spreadsheets and other office documents are not appropriate means to manage client data.

5 LOST OR STOLEN DEVICES AND PAPER DOCUMENTS

5.1 CASE No. 10: Stolen material storing encrypted personal data

5.2 CASE No. 11: Stolen material storing non-encrypted personal data.

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

5.3 CASE No. 12: Stolen paper files with sensitive data

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

5.4 Organizational and technical measures for preventing / mitigating the impacts of loss or theft of devices

  • Device encryption
  • Use passcode/password on all devices. Encrypt all mobile devices and require complex password for decryption
  • Use multi-factor authentication
  • Turn on device location services for highly mobile devices
  • Use MDM (Mobile Devices Management) and localization, remote wipe
  • Use anti-glare filters.
  • Close down unattended devices
  • If possible, store personal data on central backend server – not a mobile device
  • Automatic backup workfolders of mobile clients – when connected to corporate LAN, if personal data unavoidable there.
  • Secure VPN
  • Locks to physically secure mobile devices while unattended
  • Regulate device usage inside and outside the company
  • Centralised device management (incl. controls on software installations)
  • Physical access controls
  • Avoid storing sensitive information in mobile devices and hard drives

6 MISPOSTAL

6.1 CASE No. 13: Postal mail mistake

6.2 CASE No. 14: Highly confidential personal data sent by mail by mistake

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

6.3 CASE No. 15: Personal data sent by mail by mistake

6.4 CASE No. 16: Postal mail mistake (another example)

  • Notification to SA

6.5 Organizational and technical measures for preventing / mitigating the impacts of mispostal

  • Setting exact standards for sending letters/emails
  • User training on how to send letters/emails
  • Default use of bcc: to send emails to multiple recipients
  • Four-eyes principle
  • Automatic addressing (rather than manual)
  • Use of message delay (to allow message deletion/editing after hitting “send” button)
  • Disable auto-complete when typing email addresses
  • User awareness trainings on data breach causes
  • Training session and manuals on data breach handling

7 Other Cases – Social Engineering

7.1 CASE No. 17: Identity theft

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

7.2 CASE No. 18: Email exfiltration (HR related data)

  • Notification to SA, Communication to Data Subjects

CCC rc3 – stream playlist (slightly off-topic)

On Relive (will migrate to https://media.ccc.de/c/rc3-2021 )

Canada: Privacy and ethics : understanding the convergences and tensions for the responsible development of machine learning

https://sebastiengambs.openum.ca/privacy-and-ethics-understanding-the-convergences-and-tensions-for-the-responsible-development-of-machine-learning/

Report “Privacy and AI Ethics – Understanding the convergences and
tensions for the responsible development of machine learning

https://sebastiengambs.openum.ca/files/sites/82/2021/11/OPC_final.pdf

CANON – Canadian Anonymization Network

Website
https://deidentify.ca/

Report “Practices for Generating Non-identifiable Data” (March 2021)
https://deidentify.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/CANON-OPC-Project-Final-Report-v9.pdf

The CANON website includes an excellent list of external resources at https://deidentify.ca/resources/, including

Standards Bodies

Regulators / Government

Canada

Europe

  • Ireland Data Protection Commission – Guidance on Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation – June 2019
  • (German only) Germany Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Industry – Code of Conduct for Pseudonymization – 2019
  • European Medicines Agency – External guidance on the implementation of the European Medicines Agency policy on the publication of clinical data for medicinal products for human use – November 2018
  • (Spanish only) Spain Spanish Agency for Data Protection (AEPD) – Guidance and guarantees in the procedures on anonymization of personal data – 2016
  • Asia-Pacific

    United States

    NGOs, Not-for-Profit Organizations, etc.

    Canada

    United States

  • Future of Privacy Forum – A Visual Guide to Practical De-identification – April 2016
  • EDUCAUSE – Guidelines for Data De-identification or Anonymization – July 2015
  • National Academy of Medicine (formerly Institute of Medicine) Sharing Clinical Trial Data: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing Risk – January 2015
  • Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) – De-Identification Framework – March 2015
  • Europe

    Asia-Pacific

    Global

    • World Bank / International Household Survey Network – Statistical Disclosure Control for Microdata – A Practice Guide | A Theory Guide – October 2019

    CCC RC3: Listen to Your Heart: Security and Privacy of Implantable Cardio Foo

    https://media.ccc.de/v/rc3-2021-cwtv-272-listen-to-your-heart-s
    (see also: https://media.ccc.de/c/rc3-2021 )

    Starts with the usual security analysis of three devices by three manufacturers
    – then the talk pivots to the responses to GDPR requests (information, data portability) by actual patients from the data controllers

    Talk then closes with an anaylysis on how DSR requests were managed, which communication channels have been used, etc